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FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTUAL SUBSTRATUM AS A NEW COGNITIVE
MECHANISM FOR MATHEMATICAL CREATION
DANNY ARLEN DE JESU´S GO´MEZ-RAMI´REZ AND STEFAN HETZL
ABSTRACT. We describe a new cognitive ability, i.e., functional conceptual
substratum, used implicitly in the generation of several mathematical proofs
and definitions. Furthermore, we present an initial (first-order) formaliza-
tion of this mechanism together with its relation to classic notions like prim-
itive positive definability and Diophantiveness. Additionally, we analyze the
semantic variability of functional conceptual substratum when small syn-
tactic modifications are done. Finally, we describe mathematically natural
inference rules for definitions inspired by functional conceptual substratum
and show that they are sound and complete w.r.t. standard calculi.
Mathematical Subject Classification (2010): 03F99, 03B22
Keywords: genericity, proto-typicality, recursively enumerability, Diophantine
set, human-style proof.
INTRODUCTION
During the last decades outstanding interdisciplinary research has emerged
involving the identification and subsequently formalization of the most basic
cognitive mechanisms used by the mind during mathematical invention/crea-
tion. Among these processes one can mention formal conceptual blending
Bou et al. [2015], Fauconnier and Turner [2003]; analogical reasoning Gick
[1980], Schwering et al. [2009]; and metaphorical thinking Lakoff [2008],
Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez [2000], among others.
Now, a fundamental question related with the cognition in mathematical
research involves the description of a global taxonomy of the cognitive mech-
anisms used (for instance) by working mathematicians for creating/inventing
new mathematical results.
So, in this paper we present an additional cognitive ability, called formal
conceptual substratum, used frequently and implicitly in the construction of
mathematical arguments and definitions. We support our presentation by
a significant amount of examples. Additionally, we show an initial (first-
order) formalization of this mechanism and its relation with classic notions
like primitive positive definability, recursive enumerability and Diophantive-
ness. In addition, we analyze how strongly the semantic range of this meta-
notion varies (or not) when gradual changes are done to the language and to
1
2 DANNY ARLEN DE JESU´S GO´MEZ-RAMI´REZ AND STEFAN HETZL
the formal structures in consideration. Finally, we present natural inference
rules, insipired by functional conceptual substratum, and prove them sound
and complete w.r.t. standard calculi.
1. TAKING INSPIRATION FROM EXAMPLES
Suppose that one should solve the following elementary question:
Why when we add two even (integer) numbers the result is again an even
number?
This seems to be true for small pairs of numbers 2 ` 6 “ 8, 12 ` 18 “
30 and 214 ` 674 “ 888. Now, for getting a general proof of this fact, we
should consider syntactic expressions which can allow us to ‘represent’ the
even numbers in a compact way. Therefore, we typically come up with a
(mental) representation of the form 2 ¨ n. This means that essentially we
are able to represent the collection of even numbers simultaneously with the
single expression 2 ¨ n, where we assume implicitly that n is an integer. On
the other hand, if we know that a number c can be written as 2 ¨ d, where d is
an integer, then by definition c should be an even number. In conclusion, we
have found a compact (morphological-syntactic) expression for representing
every even number in a unified way.
Now, let us consider again the former question with the former represen-
tation in mind: First, we need to consider two (potentially different) even
numbers, so we consider (or ‘imagine’) a first even number 2 ¨ a and a sec-
ond one 2 ¨ b, where a and b are integers. Second, we sum these numbers
generically, namely, we obtain the expression 2 ¨ a ` 2 ¨ b. In addition, we
check if the final syntactic expression corresponds to an even number. Thus,
we try to give it the desired form 2 ¨#, where # is a natural number. So, we
factorize the former algebraic expression and get an expression of the form
2 ¨ pa` bq. Lastly, we realize that this number has the desired form 2 ¨x, where
x “ a`b is an integer. In conclusion, we ’proved’ an affirmative answer for the
former question by performing symbolic operations on morphological generic
representations for even numbers.
More generally, when someone tries to solve a mathematical problem,
(s)he considers, in a lot of cases, generic representations for the ‘standard’ ele-
ments living in the corresponding mathematical structures and, subsequently
(s)he performs ‘symbolic computations’ with these representations for solving
the problem and for obtaining further insights towards a final solution.
Let us consider a second example: Let fpxq be a polynomial with integer
coefficients. Then the polynomial hpxq “ fpxqf2pxq has even degree.
A very usual way for finding a proof of this statement is by taking a syntac-
tic formal representation for fpxq. Effectively, from the hypothesis we see that
fpxq can be explicitly written as amx
m ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` a0, where m P N, ai P Z and
am ‰ 0. So, we find a representation of f
2pxq asmpm´1qamx
m´2`¨ ¨ ¨`2a2.
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In conclusion, we write hpxq as
mpm´ 1qa2mx
2pm´1q ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` 2a0a2.
So, from this representation we verify that hpxq has even degree.
These morphological-syntactic representations are the seminal tools which
allow us to perform general logical inferences with single syntactic elements
and, simultaneously prevent us from repeating the same kind of arguments
for several specific instances of fpxq varying on their degrees or coefficients.
A third example comes from linear algebra. Let us assume that we have
two bases A “ tu1, . . . , unu and B “ tv1, . . . , vmu for a vector space V . So, if
we want to prove (in a standard way) that the cardinality of these two bases
is the same, i.e., m “ n, then we need to use syntactic representations of the
elements of V such as
řn
i“1 αiui (or
řm
j“1 βjvj). Effectively, one of the most
simple arguments consists of replacing gradually the elements of one base
with the elements of the other one in such a way that the resulting finite set
builds again a basis. So, one begins by writing u1 in terms of the elements of
B, i.e., u1 “
řm
j“1 γjvj , and, subsequently, one chooses a coefficient γj1 ‰ 0
in order to obtain a expression of the form
vj1 “
1
γj1
u1 `
mÿ
j“1,j‰j1
p
γj
γj1
qvj .
Thus, one can replace vj1 by u1 in B. Now, the next steps go essentially in
the same (symbolical) way.
Fourth, the classic Euclidean proof (by contradiction) of the existence of
infinitely many prime numbers uses in its core argument a kind of global
syntactic description for a number
śn
i“1 pn` 1 bigger than one, which has no
prime divisors.1
Finally, the classic proof of the fact that the cardinality of the real numbers
between zero and one (i.e. r0, 1s) is uncountable uses as seminal argument
the formal existence of a real number λ “
ř8
i“1 bi10
´i, whose explicit dec-
imal representation was chosen based on the corresponding decimal repre-
sentations of the elements of (an hypothetical enumeration) of r0, 1s, (i.e.,
aj “
ř8
r“1 aj,r10
´r) such that for all i P N, 9 ‰ bi ‰ ai,i.
2
In conclusion, this kind of ‘generic’ syntactic representation is fundamental
in several mathematical areas.
So, what lies behind the former examples is simply a specific and basic
cognitive ability in which our minds choose conceptual substrata of certain
mathematical notions (e.g. even numbers and polynomials in one variable
1Here, the assumption is that there exist finitely many prime numbers denoted by p1, . . . , pn.
2The additional condition given by 9 ‰ bi can be added for avoiding difficulties involving the
ambiguity of the decimal representation.
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with coefficient in the integers) at a suitable level of generality, and in such
a way that solving the problem simultaneously for several instances of the
concepts involved can be translated into formal manipulations of fixed single
conceptual representations chosen in advance.
In other words, the cognitive ability of conceptual substratum can be seen
as a way of identifying and effectively using the essential (e.g. proto-typical)
information of a concept in order to carry out successful deductions for solving
several kinds of (mathematical) problems.
Let us consider several additional examples which allow us to enhance our
initial intuitions about what the substratum of a (mathematical) concept is,
and about how we can get more elements towards a first precise formaliza-
tion of it. As a matter of notation we will write conceptual substrata between
brackets “r´s”, in order to clarify that we are talking about cognitive repre-
sentations of the underlying concepts and not explicitly about the concepts
themselves.
So, ifD denotes a mathematical concept (e.g., even numbers, polynomials,
matrices, vector spaces), then we will denote by CSpDq a conceptual substra-
tum of D. It is important to clarify at this point that one single concept can
have several conceptual substrata depending on the way in which we express
such a concept syntactically. For instance, the concept of a (positive) prime
number has the following two natural definitions:
pippq “ p@d P Nqpd|pÑ pd “ 1_ d “ pqq,
or equivalently
pippq “ p@a, b P Nqpp|a ¨ bÑ pp|a_ p|bqq.
From these notions one can obtain two conceptual substrata as follows:
CSpPrime Numbersq “ rd P N, d|pÑ pd “ 1_ d “ pqs,
and
CSpPrime Numbersq “ ra, b P N, p|a ¨ bÑ pp|a_ p|bqs.
Now, if one wishes to capture the essence of the notion of a prime number
through an expression given by a term instead of the former expressions given
by formulas, one can use a result of Ruiz Ruiz [2000] (among others) in order
to find a quite explicit substratum for being a prime number:
CSpPrimesq “
»
——–1`
2ptnlnnu`1qÿ
k“1
¨
˚˝˚
1´
—————–
řk
j“2 1`
Z
´
řj
s“1pt
j
s u´t
j´1
s u´2q
j
^
n
ffiffiffiffiffifl
˛
‹‹‚
fi
ffiffifl .
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Most of the former conceptual substrata were expressions describing terms.
Nonetheless, there are also a whole collection of concepts whose substrata are
typically syntactic descriptions of relations, e.g. the number-theoretic concept
of perfect number Apostol [1976]. Effectively, for this concept we can write
CSpPerf. Numbersq “
»
–2 ¨ n “ ÿ
pd|nq,pdą0q
d, n P N
fi
fl .
Another enlightening example is the concept of ’representation of the nat-
ural numbers in base m (m P N)’. Here we get
CSpm-ary Rep.q “
«
nÿ
i“0
αim
i : m P N, αi P N, 0 ď αi ă m
ff
.
We write the minimal amount of syntactic information that is required for
recovering the essential features of this kind of representation.
Our approach has some informal similarities to the one based on (proto-
)typicality presented in Osherson and Smith [1997]. In fact, finding the for-
mal substratum of a concept can be seen as trying to present explicitly a mor-
phological mathematical description of arbitrary instances of the correspond-
ing concept, by starting with the typical ones. For instance, in our second
example related with polynomials with coefficient into the integers, one can
say that an expression of the form
ř2
i“0 ciXi “ c0 ` c1x ` c2x
2, is a more
typical instance of a polynomial than a constant c0, or a monomial x
m, since
the first one uses the whole spectrum of potential operations which constitute
a polynomial (e.g., addition, multiplication and exponentiation), and the last
ones use at most one of them. Effectively, the description of the quadratic
polynomial resembles the formal substratum of the ring of polynomials better
than constants or monomials.
2. TOWARDS A FIRST FORMALIZATION
As argued above, the ability to represent an arbitrary object having a cer-
tain property in a syntactic-morphological way plays a key role from a cogni-
tive point of view. From a logical point of view this means that we are dealing
with a definition by a term, or, in the case of an r-ary property, by a tuple of
terms. Such a conceptual substratum will be called functional conceptual sub-
stratum. Let us fix a first-order logic language L and an L´structureM . Now,
taking inspiration from some of the former examples we state the following
definition:
Definition 2.1. We say that a concept defined by a (r-ary) property Ω in M
(i.e. Ω Ď M r) has a functional conceptual substratum, if there exist terms
ti (for i “ 1, . . . , r) and atomic formulas A1, . . . , Am whose variables are
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contained in tx1, . . . , xnu, such that for all a1, . . . , ar P M , pa1, . . . , arq P Ω
if and only if
M |ù pDx1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pDxnqpa1 “ t1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ ar “ tr ^A1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Amq
where t1, . . . , tn are L-terms whose variables are among x1, . . . , xn.
So, it is straightforward to verify that the notions of even, odd and compose
numbers; perfect squares and (more generally) nth-powers have functional
conceptual substrata.
In addition one can prove that this notion coincides with primitive positive
definability (see for example Bodirsky and Nesˇetˇril [2006]).
2.1. Classic Arithmetic Structures. Now, let us see how the fact that having
this kind of ‘functional conceptual representations’ materializes for several
language-structure combinations.
First, it is worth noting that if we do not put any additional restriction on
the atoms Aj in the former definition, then for some Ω it could happen that
these atoms contain even more important information about the concept C
than the terms ti, for i “ 1, . . . , n. Later, we will show explicitly this phenom-
enon with an example.
Let us consider the language L “ t0, 1,`,´, ˚,“,ău and the structure
Z, the integers. Then, each Aj has the form of either u1px1, . . . , xnq “
u2px1, . . . , xnq or u1px1, . . . , xnq ă g2px1, . . . , unq, where u1 and u2 are the
corresponding polynomials in Zrx1, . . . , xns representing the terms appearing
in Aj .
Now, in the first case Aj can be rewritten as hpx1, . . . , xnq “ 0, where h “
g1 ´ g2. For the second case, we can use the well-known fact that any natural
number can be written as the sum of four perfect squares Hardy and Wright
[2008] (i.e. Lagrange’s theorem) in order to express the condition described
by Aj in a Diophantine way, i.e.,
pDz1 ¨ ¨ ¨ z4qpg1 ´ g2 “ z
2
1 ` z
2
2 ` z
2
3 ` z
2
4 ` 1q.
In addition, one can also express finite conjunctions of polynomial equa-
tions through a single equation by using the fact that over the integers it holds
that
řn
i“1 a
2
i “ 0 if and only if each ai “ 0. So, combining all the former steps
one can construct an explicit polynomial Hpy1, . . . , yr, x1, . . . , xwq such that
Z |ù p@y1 ¨ ¨ ¨ yrqpΩpy1, . . . , yrq Ø pDx1 ¨ ¨ ¨xwqpHpy1, . . . , yr, x1, . . . , xwq “ 0qq.
In other words, Ω defines a Diophantine set [Matiyasevich, 1993, Ch. 1].
Furthermore, by the MRDP theorem [Matiyasevich, 1993, Ch. 2] Ω defines
a recursively enumerable set. In fact, one can easily prove that a concept C
over the integers, described with the former language which has an functional
conceptual substratum, must be recursively enumerable. Conversely, if C is
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a concept defining a recursively enumerable property Θ, then by the MRDP
theorem Θ is Diophantine. Thus, for all a1 . . . , ar P Z, a1, . . . , ar P Θ if and
only if
Z |ù pDx1 ¨ ¨ ¨xmqpF pa1, . . . , ar, x1, . . . , xmq “ 0qq.
We can rewrite this formula as
Z |ù pDx1 ¨ ¨ ¨xmqpDx
1
1 ¨ ¨ ¨x
1
rqpa1 “ x
1
1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ ar “ x
1
r ^A1qq
where A1 denotes the atom F px
1
1, . . . , x
1
r, x1, . . . , xmq “ 0qq.
3
In conclusion, for Z expressed in the language L “ t0, 1,`,´, ˚,“,ău a
concept C describing an n´ary property Ω has functional conceptual substra-
tum if and only if Ω is recursively enumerable, which is equivalent to being
Diophantine.
2.2. The Notion of a Prime Number. By the former considerations, the set of
prime numbers has an functional conceptual substratum. More explicitly, one
can find an explicit polynomial inequality in the integers characterizing the
positive prime numbers. For example, based on the main result of Jones et al.
[1976] we can describe an (atomic) conceptual substratum of the prime num-
bers as follows
CSpPrime Numbersq “ rk, pk ` 2qp1´ pwz ` h` j ´ qq2
´ppgk ` 2g ` k ` 1qph` jq ` h´ zq2 ´ p2n` p` q ` z ´ eq2´
p16pk ` 1q3pk ` 2qpn` 1q2 ` 1´ f2q2 ´ pe3pe ` 2qpa` 1q2 ` 1´ o2q2
´ppa2 ` 1qy2 ` 1´ x2q2 ´ p16r2y4pa2 ´ 1q ` 1´ u2q2
pppa` u2pu2 ` aqq2 ´ 1qpn` 4dyq2 ` 1´ px` cuq2q2 ´ pn` l ` v ´ yq2
´ppa2 ´ 1ql2 ` 1´m2q2 ´ pai ` k ` 1´ l ´ iq2
´pp` lpa´ n´ 1q ` bp2an` 2a´ n2 ´ 2n´ 2q ´mq2
´pq ` ypa´ p´ 1q ` sp2ap` 2a´ p2 ´ 2p´ 2q ´ xq2
3In this case, the essential information of the concept can be, at least formally, codified more
in the atom A1 rather than in the initial polynomial expressions.
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´pz ` plpa´ pq ` tp2ap´ p2 ´ 1q ´mpq2q ą 0,
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, h, j, l,m, n, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z P Ns
In addition, by Lagrange’s theorem and by adding four new existential
quantified variables replacing each of the former 26 variables, one can show
that there exists a polynomial P px1, . . . , x108q with integer coefficients, such
that
CSpPrime Numbersq “ rx1, P px1, . . . , x108q ą 0, x2, . . . , x108 P Zs
So, the concept of prime numbers has an functional conceptual substratum
over Z described in the former language.
Now, let us focus on the question of deciding if the concept of prime num-
bers has an functional conceptual substratum where the atoms Aj have either
the form xrj ă cj or cj ă xcj .
So, essentially this question is equivalent to finding a polynomial with inte-
ger coefficients fpx1, . . . , xnq such that the set of the prime numbers is gener-
ated as the image of the domain defined by the atomic restrictionsA1, . . . , Am.
Let us prove by induction on n that this cannot happen.
First, let us suppose that fpxq is a polynomial in one variable with restric-
tions given by A1 – x ă c1 and/orA2 – c2 ă x. The case where the domain is
either empty or finite (parametrized by two atoms) is clearly ruled out, since
its image should be an infinite set. The single cases given by just one of the
former atoms can be reduced to the case x ą c1, because the second case can
be reduced to this one by means of the change of variables y “ ´x.
In conclusion, let us assume by the sake of contradiction that there exists a
polynomial fpxq with integer coefficients together with a constant c P Z such
that the image under f of the set Ząc is the set of the prime numbers (or an
infinite subset of it). Let us choose an integer d ą c. If we denote by p the
prime number fpdq, it is an elementary fact to see that for all z P Z
fppz ` dq ” fpdq ” 0 pmod pq.
Thus, since fppz ` dq should be a prime number for all z ě 0, then
fppz ` dq “ p. Therefore, f should be a constant polynomial, which is a
contradiction.
Now, let us assume the induction’s hypothesis for any k ă n. Again, sup-
pose by contradiction that there exists a polynomial fpx1, . . . , xnq with coeffi-
cients in the integers and atoms (restrictions) A1, . . . , Am such that the image
of the domain determined by the restrictions consists of (an infinite subset
of) the prime numbers. Again, by doing suitable changes and permutations of
variables we can assume without loss of generality that there exists s P Z with
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1 ď s ď m, and constants ci P Z such that Ai – xi ą ci, for all i “ 1, . . . , s.
Thus, since there are just finitely many potential choices for the values of the
xi’s (with i ą s) which satisfy the restrictions, we see that there are con-
stants es`1, . . . , en P Z satisfying all the remaining conditions As`1, . . . , Am,
such that the image of the domain described by the first s atomic restrictions
under the polynomial
gpx1, . . . , xsq “ fpx1, . . . , xs, es`1, . . . , emq
is an infinite subset of the prime numbers. So, if s ă m we are done by the
induction’s hypothesis, since g has fewer variables than f .
In the second case, it is an elementary fact to see that for any non-constant
polynomial gpx1, . . . , xsq in several variables with integer (or even real) coef-
ficients, and for any parameters c1, . . . , cs P R (defining atomic restriction as
before), there exists an index i1 and an integer (resp. a real number) e ą ci
such that h “ fpx1, . . . , xi´1, e, xi`1, . . . , xsq is a non-constant polynomial.
Now, using this fact, we obtain a non-constant polynomial h in s ´ 1 vari-
ables, such that the image of the remaining restrictions under h is an infinite
subset of the prime numbers, which is a contradiction.
Summarizing, the existence of functional conceptual representations de-
pends strongly on the degree of freedom that we give to the corresponding
atomic formulas.
On the other hand, let us modify the language slightly by trying to charac-
terize the prime numbers as a kind of ‘sub-concept’ of the natural numbers N
with the language L´ “ t0, 1,`, ˚,“,ău, and with the former constrains for
the atoms Ai. So, by applying basically the same method as before, we obtain
again a negative answer.
However, if we do not impose any kind of restriction on the atoms, then us-
ing the same former result of Jones et at. one can find two explicit polynomial
P1pa, b, . . . , zq and P2pa, b, . . . , zq with coefficients into the natural numbers
such that
CSpPrime Numbersq “ rk, P1pa, b, . . . , zq ą P2pa, b, . . . , zq, b, c, . . . , zs
So, the notion of prime numbers has also an functional conceptual substratum
over N with the restricted language L´.
2.3. The Arithmetical Invariance of Functional Conceptual Substratum.
More generally, if we restrict ourselves to a concept C described by a n´
relation in N, then the fact that C has an functional conceptual substratum
does not change if we expand the language involved (resp. the corresponding
structure) by adding the operation´pq. Specifically, the following general fact
holds:
Proposition 2.2. Let C be a concept described by a r´ary relationD in N. Then
C has an functional conceptual substratum in L´, if and only if C (seen as a
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concept described by the corresponding r´ary relationD Ď Z) has an functional
conceptual substratum in L.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that r “ 1 (the general
argument is essentially the same). First, let us suppose that there is an
L´functional conceptual substratum for C involving fpx1, . . . , xnq and atoms
A1, . . . , Ar. Now, we will add an extra variable z in order to be able to cod-
ify the fact that a1 “ fpx1, . . . , xnq through the atoms a1 “ z and Ar`1 ”
z “ fpx1, . . . , xnq. This allows us to update f by a polynomial with positive
coefficients.
By Lagrange’s theorem and by adding (eventually) new existential quan-
tified variables, we can assume that all the atoms involve only the equality
relation. Effectively, this follows from the relations
p@a, b P Zqpa ă bØ a` 1 ď bq,
p@c, d P Zqpc ď dØ pDy1, y2, y3, y4 P Zqpd ´ c “
4ÿ
i“1
y2i qq.
An additional simplification consists in reducing the number of atoms to
one, by using the fact that
p@e, g P Zppe “ 0^ g “ 0q Ø e2 ` g2 “ 0qq.
So, let us assume the we have just one atom A.
Furthermore, the fact that there are existential conditions for A involving
variables z and x1, . . . , xn varying over Z, can be re-written as new atom A
1
involving variables z1 and x11, . . . , x
1
n varying now over N.
In fact, if A ” h1pz, x1, . . . , xnq “ h2pz, x1, . . . , xnq, then the fact that there
exists z, x1, . . . , xn P Z such that Apz, x1, . . . , xnq is equivalent to say that that
there exist z1, x11, . . . , x
1
n P N such thatł
ph1p˘z,˘x
1
1, . . . ,˘x
1
nq “ h2p˘z,˘x
1
1, . . . ,˘x
1
nqq,
where the former expression involves 2n`1 atoms corresponding to all the
possible combinations of signs. Now, by writing each of the former equalities
as ϕjpx
1q “ 0, for j “ 1, . . . , 2n`1, we can re-write the former expression as
the single atomic condition
Φpz1, x1q “
2
n`1ź
j“1
ϕjpz
1, x1q “ 0.
Finally, we can re-write this condition as a polynomial equality of the form
γ1pz
1, x1q “ γ2pz
1, x1q involving only positive coefficients.
So, for all a P N, a P D if and only if
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pDw1 ¨ ¨ ¨wn`1qpa “ w1 ^ γ1pw1, . . . , wn`1q “ γ2pw1, . . . , wn`1qq.
This means that C has L´functional conceptual substratum.
Conversely, we replace in a L´´functional conceptual subtratum, any vari-
able xj by four variables yj,1, yj,2, yj,3 and yj,4; and we replace each occur-
rence of xj by
ř4
i“1 y
2
i . So, by Lagrange’s theorem, we obtain an L´functional
conceptual substratum for C. 
Remark 2.3. If we replace in the former proposition functional conceptual
substratum by Diophantine, then the answer is quite different. Effectively, by
the MRDP theorem we know that the ‘Diophantine’ L´concepts are exactly
the recursively enumerable. However, the set of Diophantive L´´concepts
corresponds to a strictly smaller sub-collection of them. Specifically, if r “
1, then it is an elementary exercise to prove that the only two Diophantine
L´´subsets of N (i.e. subsets described as projections over N of a polynomial
with non-negative coefficients) are t0u and N. In general, one can verify by
induction over r that a subset Ω Ď Nr is L´´Diophantine if it has the form
finiteď
i“pi1,...,ikq
kź
r“1
N
pirq,
where is P t0, 1u and we define N
0 “ t0u and N1 “ N.
3. NATURAL AND COMPLETE DEFINITION RULES FOR FUNCTIONAL
CONCEPTUAL SUBSTRATUM
Let us denote by LKe the sequent calculus for first-order predicate logic
with equality (over a language L) with the standard inference rules (see for
instance Buss [1998], Takeuti [2013]). Let us enlarge the language L with a
new r´ary predicate symbol D which we will define in terms of a functional
conceptual substratum in the language L, i.e., by a definition of the form
Dpa1, . . . , arq ô pDx1 ¨ ¨ ¨xnqpa1 “ t1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ ar “ tr ^A1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Amq
where t1, . . . , tn are L´terms and A1, . . . , Am are L-atoms whose variables
are (both) among x1, . . . , xn.
Now, a standard approach to incorporate definitions into a sequent calculus
is to add definition rules which allow unfolding the defined predicate symbol.
In our setting this gives rise to the rules
φpa1, . . . , arq,ΓÑ ∆
Dpa1, . . . , arq,ΓÑ ∆
DL and
ΓÑ ∆, φpa1, . . . , arq
ΓÑ ∆, Dpa1, . . . , arq
DR
where φpa1, . . . , arq abbreviates the formula defining Dpa1, . . . , arq as above.
We denote the sequent calculus obtained from adding these rules to LKe as
LKepDq. These rules correspond to inferences that syntactically replace into
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a proof the former definition of the new relational symbol within the left and
right part of a sequent, respectively.
Lemma 3.1. For any formula ψ, LKepDq $ ψ Ø ψrDzφs, where ψrDzφs
denotes the formula obtained after replacing D by φ in ψ.
Proof. This fact can be straightforwardly proved by induction on the (syntac-
tic) complexity of ψ, decomposing the equivalence into two implications and
using the new pair of rules. 
The calculus LKepDq is a conservative extension of LKe in the following
sense:
Theorem 3.2. For any formula ψ, LKepDq $ ψ if and only if LKe $ ψrDzφs.
Proof. pñq Let P be a proof of ψ in LKepDq. Then, by replacing D in P by
φ and removing DL- and DR-inferences, we obtain a proof P
1 of ψrDzφs in
LKe.
pðq Let P be an LKe-proof of ψrDzφs. Obtain an LKepDq-proof Q of
ψrDzφs Ñ ψ from Lemma 3.1. Then a cut on P and Q gives an LKepDq-
proof of ψ. 
The above definition rules treat definitions in general. However, a defini-
tion of a concept that has a functional conceptual substratum is typically used
in a more specific way in mathematical proofs. For example, when showing
that the sum of n and m is even if m and n are, one may start the proof by a
phrase like “Since n is even, n “ 2a (for some a P N)”. For the general case,
this is formalized by the rule
a1 “ t1rxzζs, . . . , ar “ trrxzζs, A1rxzζs, . . . , Amrxzζs,ΓÑ ∆
Dfcs
LDpa1, . . . , arq,ΓÑ ∆
Similarily, one may end the proof with a phrase like “2 ¨ pa ` bq is even”. For
the general case, this is formalized by the rule
ΓÑ ∆, A1rxzus ¨ ¨ ¨ ΓÑ ∆, Amrxzus
ΓÑ ∆, Dpt1rxzus, . . . , trrxzusq
Dfcs
R
We write LKfcse for the calculus obtained from LKe by adding these two
rules. We will now verify that LKfcse pDq is sound and complete w.r.t. LKepDq.
To that aim, we first relate it to LKe.
Lemma 3.3. For any formula ψ, LK fcse pDq $ ψ Ø ψrDzφs.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the syntactic complexity of ψ. The only
non-trivial case is when ψ is Dpv1, . . . , vrq.
We obtain an LKfcse pDq-proof of Dpv1, . . . , vrq Ñ φpv1, . . . , vrq by applying
a Dfcs
L
-inference, n Dr-inferences, and r `m´ 1 ^r-inferences.
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In the other direction, we obtain an LKfcse pDq-proof of φpv1, . . . , vrq Ñ
Dpv1, . . . , vrq as follows:
A1rxzζs Ñ A1rxzζs ¨ ¨ ¨ Amrxzζs Ñ Amrxzζs
A1rxzζs, . . . , Amrxzζs Ñ Dpt1rxzζs, . . . , trrxzζsq
Dfcs
R
v1 “ t1rxzζs, . . . , vr “ trrxzζs, A1rxzζs, . . . , Amrxzζs Ñ Dpv1, . . . , vrq
eq.
v1 “ t1rxzζs ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ vr “ trrxzζs ^A1rxzζs ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Amrxzζs Ñ Dpv1, . . . , vrq
^r`m´1
l
φpv1, . . . , vrq Ñ Dpv1, . . . , vrq
Dn
l

Theorem 3.4. For any formula ψ, LKfcse pDq $ ψ if and only if LKe $ ψrDzφs.
Proof. pñq Let P be a proof of ψ in LKfcse pDq. We replace D in P by φ,
simulating a Dfcs
L
-inferece by n Dl-inferences, and m` r´ 1 ^l-inferences and
a Dfcs
R
-inference by
ΓÑ ∆, A1rxzus ¨ ¨ ¨ ΓÑ ∆, Amrxzus
ΓÑ ∆, A1rxzus ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Amrxzus
^m´1r
ΓÑ ∆, t1rxzus “ t1rxzus ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ trrxzus “ trrxzus ^A1rxzus ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^Amrxzus
eq.
ΓÑ ∆, φpt1rxzus, . . . , trrxzusq
Dnr
Thus we obtain a proof P 1 of ψrDzφs in LKe
pðq Let P be an LKe-proof of ψrDzφs. Obtain an LKepDq-proof Q of
ψrDzφs Ñ ψ from Lemma 3.3. Then a cut on P and Q gives an LKfcse pDq-
proof of ψ. 
Corollary 3.5. For any formula ψ, LKfcse pDq $ ψ iff LKepDq $ ψ.
Thus one does not loose power by using these specialized definition rules
for defined predicate symbols with functional conceptual substratum. On the
other hand, one gains a mathematically more natural use of these defined
symbols.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The general meta-notion of conceptual substratum (and its particular form
as functional conceptual substratum) serves as a new kind of (meta-mathema-
tical) cognitive mechanism of seminal importance used (implicitly) in mathe-
matical creation/invention.
Moreover, the initial first-order formalization of this meta-concept turns
out to be equivalent to central notions in theoretical computer sciences and
elementary number theory. In addition, (functional) conceptual substratum
suggests an additional way of developing proof-theoretical frameworks with a
stronger human-style structure. So, subsequent formalizations of conceptual
substratum in higher-order frameworks could bring new light in our quest for
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understanding how mathematical creation/invention works and for develop-
ing software being able to solve mathematical problems at higher levels of
abstraction.
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